Putin Axes Top Adviser

(PresidentialWire.com)- When the Russian military invaded Ukraine in the early hours of February 24, many observers expected a quick triumph.
According to reports, the veteran commander expected to roll into adjacent territory, smash a little opposition, and be greeted by happy Ukrainians bringing food and salt.
It’s a bloody and gloomy reality for the Russian invaders, leading Putin to start dismissing high-level officials he blames for the defeats, analysts say.
Simon Miles, an assistant professor at Duke’s Sanford School of Public Policy and a Soviet historian, believes he is scapegoating those he believes deceived him. In mid-March, Putin reportedly sacked Roman Gavrilov, the deputy chief of the Russian national guard; Russian media said Gavrilov resigned. One source told Bellingcat that Gavrilov was fired due to military information leaks that resulted in the loss of life, while two others said it was due to wasteful wasting of fuel.
Days later, rumors surfaced that Putin had placed two top FSB personnel under house arrest for intelligence failures in Ukraine. According to Andrei Soldatov, a Russian journalist and intelligence specialist, one of these officials were transported to Lefortovo prison, an infamous FSB cell on the outskirts of Moscow.
Experts say that if Putin dislikes information or counsel from advisers, he is to blame for fostering an authoritarian atmosphere of fear that allowed falsehoods to reach him.
Many have pondered why Putin got it wrong after a deadlock earlier this month led Russia to recede from Kyiv and focus on the east.
According to sources, some of the firings in Russia’s intelligence agency may be the consequence of failed political warfare within Ukraine.
The FSB’s foreign intelligence section undoubtedly put up Pre-invasion networks of pro-Kremlin political parties in Ukraine, but they never materialized.
Experts say the Russian intelligence organization and Putin’s aides fed him inaccurate or exaggerated information.
That they had created the framework for a far more powerful internal opposition to Zelenskyy, precipitated by Russian forces crossing the border, but, as we all know, it never happened.
Putin may have underestimated internal Ukrainian resistance to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, according to Russian politics and economics expert Daniel Treisman of UC Los Angeles.
Polls showed Zelenksyy was unpopular. Before the war, Zelenskyy’s approval rating was 30%, and the Ukrainian Parliament was much lower.
Putin believed that a significantly more extensive section of the Ukrainian populace felt attached to Russia and alienated by the Ukrainian government administration.
It was recently reported that Putin’s senior aides deliberately misled him about the conflict because they were too terrified to tell him the reality.
When a single person wields all state authority, advisors and workers have a solid motive to impress the boss.
To relate to Russia’s early military defeats in Ukraine, Miles suspects Miles was fed exaggerated information by FSB personnel now supposedly under house arrest. “And when his intelligence services delivered him information, they acted confidently.”
Miles adds that negative news spreads slowly in totalitarian nations.
“No one likes to admit things aren’t going well,” Miles added. “No one wants to take the risk of presenting an alternative.”
Putin has a long history of firing opponents. Weeks before his reelection, President George W. Bush sacked Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and his government. Kasyanov has criticized Putin’s strategy of dealing with oil oligarchs, The Washington Post noted.
A viral video showed Putin asking Russia’s spy head to declare “yes” or “no” to recent Russian operations in Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin cut off Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, often giving a rare peek into the Kremlin’s inner workings.
“He received the awful advice he sought,” English said of Putin.
His ego and vanity fuelled him, so he dismissed independent thinkers, pushed aside those who disagreed, and progressively elevated those who did.
Putin’s circle has a disinformation issue, and it is decreasing. Ongoing media coverage of Putin’s increasing isolation in the months building up to the invasion of Ukraine.
Experts say his drift toward seclusion has been developing for decades.
“He had a diverse group of advisors when he started in the early 2000s,” Treisman added. Then there are the hardline Russian nationalist buddies and advisors.
Putin’s social seclusion has now become physical. Miles claimed Putin spent much of his time in office in the presidential estate an hour outside Moscow. Putin entered the Kremlin only for official business.
But the COVID-19 outbreak heightened Putin’s isolationist tendencies. The 69-year-old has made them do various tests and isolation for days to meet face-to-face.
“So the loneliness isn’t. And I believe that isolation influenced his choice to start this, “Miles stated of the conflict.
It was reminiscent of a previous period in Russian history when Putin seemed confident and miscalculated. They were reluctant to invade Afghanistan in 1979, a battle that eventually contributed to the USSR’s demise. Officials anticipated the invasion’s consequences, English added.
“In the end, they were disregarded, and a tiny group, four senior individuals, kind of hastily decided,” English added.
Like Putin, the Soviet authorities went to war despite all signs of failure. Some even expected the Soviets to be greeted as liberators in Afghanistan, as Putin expected in Ukraine. Neither did.
According to English, today’s fear of stepping out of line in the USSR and Russia resulted in erroneous or partial information reaching the top.
“You don’t ascend through the Communist Party system or the Putin administration if you’re an independent, critical thinker,” he remarked.
Both incidents show what happens when autocrats with egos and biases gain power and have no one to check them.
When things go wrong, the leader blames others around them, even if they didn’t have a choice because they were terrified, safeguarding their jobs and families by telling the boss what they want to hear.
Putin was fed exaggerated information by FSB personnel now supposedly under house arrest, and when his intelligence services delivered him information, they acted confidently. The Russian president’s ego and vanity fuelled him, so he dismissed independent thinkers, pushed aside those who disagreed, and progressively elevated those who did. Putin’s isolation was reminiscent of a previous period in Russian history when officials were reluctant to invade Afghanistan, a battle that eventually contributed to the USSR’s demise.